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Calendar
February 3-Denver Bar Association regular monthly meeting, 12:15 P. M.,
Chamber of Commerce dining room, Hon. J. W. Delehant, United States
District Judge, District of Nebraska, speaker.
March 3-Denver Bar Association regular monthly meeting, 12:15 P. M.,
Chamber of Commerce dining room. The speaker will be William W.
Crowdus, of St. Louis, Mo., one of the leaders in the adoption in Missouri
of the non-partisan judicial selection plan in effect there.

What Price Justice
By

ALBERT EDWARD SHERLOCK

*

The writer has just been appointed chairman of the Justice Court Committee of the Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association. That
committee is studying the court systems in all the 48 states and British commonwealths, and securing all possible data on all Colorado courts for the past
ten years. In the course of its work it will print in DICTA and mail to the bar
of Colorado, information about its work and findings, so that, aided by suggestions from the bar, the best non-partisan judiciary can be secured for
Colorado.
Prior to that appointment, however, the writer commenced an investigation, on his own initiative, of the Colorado justice courts, and presents it to
the bar for its suggestions relative to justice courts.
Should they be:
1. Abolished?
2. Consolidated?
3. Made a part of the County courts?
4. Become separate magistrate courts?
5. Retained without change?
Let us hear from you.
This article is an attempt to enlighten the voters for suggestive remedial
procedure. The justice of the peace in America arrived with the Mayflower
and has not been improved since that day. Our modes of transportation, both
on highways and in the air, have progressed while the office of the justice of
the peace remains as staid as on the day of its creation.
* Of the Denver bar.
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The institution of justice of the peace may be said to date from the year
1360, when the statute 34 Edw. III, c. 1, appointed "one lord, and with him
three or four of the most worthy in the county, with some learned in the law"
to keep the peace and try felonies and trespasses at the king's suit. But this
authority obtained only when two or more of these officials acted together.
From then on they became known as justices and very soon thereafter reference was made to them as "justices of the peace," in the statute 36 Edw. III,
c. 12 (1362).
The justices of the peace in Colorado are constitutional officers and derive
their authority from Article VI, Section 25 of the Colorado Constitution, and
are qualified as county officers. (Thrush vs. The People, 53 Colo. 544-547,
127 Pac. 937). Both the constitution of Colorado and the statutes enacted
subsequent to the adoption of the constitution are silent as to any qualification a justice of the peace in Colorado must possess. The only statutory requirements enumerated are that he or she must be a qualified voter and a resident of the particular precinct in which he or she may have been elected or
appointed by the county commissioners of that county.
Under date of January 6, 1946, there were 260 justices of the peace in
Colorado.1 Under date of September 28, 1946, 258 questionnaires were mailed
to the list as supplied to the writer by the Secretary of State, and returns from
131 of said justices of the peace who answered the questionnaire above referred to reveals some very interesting facts and supports my argument for a
reform or abolition of the present system. There were:
12 Farmers
10 Federal or local government employees
3 Housewives
11 Laborers
13 Merchants
5 Office Workers
7 Professional
12 Real estate and insurance
22 Trades
7 Retired
9 Returned unclaimed-address unknown
8 Deceased
6 Resigned
6 Not qualified
127 No reply
258
Of the above replies received by the writer, 34 held a notary public cornLetter from the Secretary of State to the writer dated January 9, 1946.

DICTA

mission, 17 were licensed real estate brokers and 22 sold various forms of insurance.
The charter amendment of the City and County of Denver provides for
the appointment of justices of the peace by the mayor and their qualifications
are set forth in the charter; therefore no questionnaire was mailed to the justices of the peace or police judge of the City and County of Denver and nothing that I have said is to be construed as a reflection upon any of those gentlemen.
From the above statistics can be made a comparative analysis as to the
qualifications of the various justices of the peace. The answers to the writer
were courteous, in most instances prompt, and in many cases very humorous,
and advocated a reform from their viewpoint. I communicated with those
who suggested a change in procedure and with their permission I quote some
of the replies received, not revealing their identity. The purpose of the quotations is to inform the voters that the people they elected to satisfy their petty
quarrels are really permanent members of an inferior court. From Mr.
I quote:
"One 'true fact' as it is now is that justice fees are the same as they were
when common labor was $1.00 per day. The boy who mows my lawn gets
more than I do for messing with other people's troubles.
"I will quote from a letter that I wrote to a member of the committee
that was asking me for a statement of my income from justice fees: 'Ifyour
committee will see to it that justices get more Greek weddings, with sizable
fees and twelve hours of refreshments both liquid and solid, and less request
for the collection of whiskered accounts by way of the small claims court,
you will have done us a good turn.'"
, ex-justice of the peace, I quote:
From Mr. -"I was nominated in 1942 much against my desire and only on the last
day filed an acceptance, then qualified against my better judgment. Ditto
1944, and got all I could stand and resigned June 1st, 1945, and if the good
Lord keeps me in my normal senses, never again will I be caught in such a
position."
From Mr. -,
I quote:
"I am heartily in favor of establishing some method or methods by which
a justice of the peace might have to qualify himself as to his ability to sit on
this bench and in this, I fully realize that I, myself would probably be disqualified. Even so, I do not believe that the bar association should be permitted by the legislature to make as one of these qualifications, membership
within that group. I do not believe, either that these members should be restricted from sitting as justices of the peace, with the limitations as now set
forth in the state statutes. I do believe that there are many people living in
this state who are intellectually qualified to sit on these benches who have
never attended law school or perhaps a university. I believe that an education
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is obtainable'on our streets and in our books, papers and magazines that come
to us after our school days are over. I believe that there are graduates from
other walks of life who would make admirable justices. I do not believe that
the state would be unreasonable in requiring that a justice be compelled to
pass a fair intelligence test, designed not to see how much law the person
already knew but to see how much law the individual might be able to absorb,
with the job to be held as the sole objective.
"Insofar as I am personally concerned, it makes little difference. I do
not seek to earn a livelihood by this means and I very frequently find these
duties seriously interfering with those in which I am more vitally interested.
No doubt, before any legislation whatsoever becomes law in this matter, I
will have turned my docket over to someone else. I realize, however, in this
matter, there is danger in going too far in attempting to improve a condition
that is not nearly so serious as some of our state laws which are going unheeded."
The office of the justice of the peace has been criticized throughout the
press for many years mainly on the system of fee collection basis which dates
back to colonial days. "The justices, being subject to no supervision, and
depending so much on their fees that J. P. came to mean 'Judgment for
the Plaintiff,' formed unholy alliances with collection agencies, installment
houses, and the like, and very generally became actually corrupt. 2 "The idea
is that every such district will have men of substantial worth who will willingly accept a place in a responsible judicial system. Their local standing and
practical judgment, assisted by expert direction, will permit just that flexible,
informal, and decentralized procedure which has always been aimed at in
this country, and which seems to exemplify the American instinct for local
government. The type would be that of the local Solomon, whereas the J. P.
too often suggests Dogberry." 3
This is well illustrated in the following example from our sister state,
New Mexico:
"The Village of Ruidoso, New Mexico, County of Lincoln
RESOLUTION NO. 1.
"BE it resolved by the Board of Trustees of the Village of Ruidoso, New
Mexico,
"That there shall be appointed a village police judge who shall be the
present justice of the peace George H. Seele. The court over which said police
judge shall preside shall be known as the Municipal or Police Court of the
Village of Ruidoso and such court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction
"Justice and the Poor" by Reginald Heber Smith, p. 42.
',"Ultimate Types of Inferior Courts and Judges" by Herbert Harley of the Chicago Bar, Secretary of the American Judicature Society, Case and Comment, V. 22,
No. 1, June, 1915, p. 8.
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of the violation of any and all ordinances of the Village of Ruidoso.
"Be is further resolved that, the said Police Judge of the Village of
Ruidoso shall be paid a salary set on a fee basis and that the maximum of
($1.00) one dollar per conviction on each and every conviction be paid said
Police Judge.
Passed and approved this 11th day of January, 1946.
Approved
0. W. McElhaney, Mayor.
Attest:
L. F. Dryden, Clerk.
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is certified to be a true copy of
Resolution number 1 passed and approved by the Board of Trustees of the
Village of Ruidoso, New Mexico the 11th day of January, 1946. Subsequent
to passage of this resolution it was found to be unconstitutional in this state
and another resolution has been passed voiding this resolution and placing
said Police Judge on monthly salary basis regardless of convictions or acquittals
or number of cases before him.
(SEAL)
Attest:
L. F. Dryden, Clerk"
The late Chief Justice William Howard Taft of the United States Supreme Court in a learned and celebrated opinion reversed a justice of the
peace decision on the sole propriety of the pernicious fee system and I quote
from pages 437 and 442 of Vol. 47, Supreme Court Reporter:
"It is a denial of due process of law, in violation of Const. U. S. amend.
14, to subject the liberty and property of a defendant to the judgment of a
court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest
in reaching a conclusion against him in his case."
"There was at the common law the greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest however small or infinitesimal in the justices
of the peace. In Hawkins, 2 Pleas of the Crown, Bk. 2, ch. 8, ss 68, 69 we
find the following: 'The general rule of law certainly is that justices of the
peace ought not to execute their office in their own case (citing 1 Salk.
396) ;'"4
The General Assembly of the State of Iowa said in a resolution passed,
and I quote:
"HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 11
"Whereas, justice of peace courts were provided under the law some 75
or 80 years ago when townships were important governmental units and courts
4 Tumey v. State of Ohio, Supreme Court Reporter 272-274 U. S. Vol. 47,
pp. 437 and 442.
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of that type were necessary in the administration of civil and criminal procedure; and
"Whereas, The law still provides for the election of two justices and two
constables in each township, making a total of 32 justices of peace and 32 constables in the average 16 township county; and
"Whereas, the nomination and election of said justices and constables
add to the length of the ballot and time of counting boards at each biennial
election; and,
"Whereas, that type of court is no longer necessary and has been superseded in some instances by superior and municipal courts; and,
"Whereas, in some localities adjacent to larger towns and cities said
justice courts have been misused; and,
"Whereas, justice of peace courts and procedure are entirely outmoded
and of no further practical benefit to the public;
"BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE, THE SENATE
CONCURRING: That a committee of six be appointed, three by the President of the Senate from the Senate, and three by the Speaker of the House
from the House, said committee to investigate said situation and report to
this General Assembly, or the one following, making recommendations for
the improvement and betterment of said conditions and making proposals to
change, amend or substitute laws or procedure so as to attain practical efficiency and satisfactory administration of the law." 5
So the move is on in various parts of the country, particularly in the
Rocky Mountain region for a uniform system relative to the administration
of justice in the inferior courts, more particularly the justice court, and the
time is now ripe for that procedure. Most of this has been brought about by
the long years of following a tradition and not realizing the importance of the
impression made on the litigant whose first and sometimes only experience is
that of the justice court. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes of the United
States Supreme Court has said:
"That upon the minor courts rests the burden of all our legal institutions.
Approximately seven million persons are haled annually as defendants into
these lower courts of the United States. The most cautious and law-abiding
citizen is likely at any time to be summoned before a magistrate or police judge
to explain some petty infraction of our complex laws. " 6
And this is again illustrated in the following:
"The little old fashioned solicitor in a small country town who is called
upon at intervals to advise the squire, the merchants, the trades union official
and the lady J. P. on the trial of the village undesirable, does not always, as
my experience goes, know too much of either law or evidence, but some times
' Letter from Chief Clerk, House of Representatives, State of Iowa, dated October
5, 1946.
'."Befuddled

Justice" by Thomas Coiapere, Forcm 84, July-Dec. 1930, p. 34-43.
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more about the defendant's private life or reputation than is or could be admissible in evidence in the case." 7
And again from a very learned article by Mitchell Dawson I quote:
"The state sets the squire up in the business of dispensing justice by the
peace. He parcels it out at fixed prices, quaintly known as costs, which go
into the pockets of the justice and the constable. In most states it is the only
way these worthies have of getting paid.
"In criminal cases under this system, it is always better business for the
squire to find the defendant guilty and squeeze the costs out of him than to
let him go and try to collect from the county. Everything is arranged so that
the expense of administering justice will fall on the defendants instead of the
public. Some states offer a bonus of higher costs for convictions than for
acquittals; others go farther and say that a magistrate is not entitled to any
costs unless he convicts the defendant, though the Supreme Court held this
unconstitutional." 8
And a further quotation by A. J. Walling:
"Lord Coke said: 'The whole Christian world hath not the like office as
justice of the peace, if duly executed.'
"The stress, it will be noted, lies on the office and not upon the person
of the justice, which has not escaped criticism either anciently or recently. If
there is less humor there is even more pungency in the ironies the modern
journalist applies to the Great Unpaid than in Shakespeare's portrait of Mr.
Justice Shallow." 9
For a recent discussion on the national justice of the peace system, I refer
you to Coronet Magazine, January 1947, entitled, "Highway Robbery Coast
to Coast," by Norman Carlisle.
Now that we have introduced Mr. Justice Shallow on the scene, I quote:
"No appearance for defendant.
"This case was tried in a justice's court on appeal before a jury, the Honorable R. G. Riggins, justice of the peace, presiding. His Honor charged the
jury as follows: 'Gentlemen, this is a case which has been tried by me before,
and I decided in favor of defendant; I further charge you, gentlemen, that
if you find that any settlement has been made, you find for defendant; retire
and make up your verdict.'
"The law does not require a justice of the peace to charge the jury at
all; his ignorance of the law, as well as propriety, would seem to demand
"The Justice of the Peace," The Spectator (London) V. 150, Jan.-June, 1933,
"'The Justice of the Peace Racket," by Mitchell Dawson, American Mercury,

p. 44.

V. 46-48, p. 310-313, 1939.

',"The Justice of the Peace," by R. A. J. Walling, Spectator (London) V. 149,
July-Dec. 1932 p. 885.
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that he should not, but if he undertakes to instruct the jury, he must do it
correctly and in accordance with law. A justice of the peace is generally a
man of consequence in his neighborhood; he writes the wills, draws the deeds
and pulls the teeth of the people; also he performs divers surgical operations
on the animals of his neighbors. The justice has played his part on the busy
stage of life from the time of Mr. Justice Shallow down to the time of Mr.
Justice Riggins. Who has not seen the gaping listening crowd assembled
around his honor, the justice, on tiptoe to catch the words of wisdom as they
fell from his venerated lips?
" 'And still they gazed,
And still the wonder grew,
That one small head
Could carry all he knew!' "10
And to throw certain enlightment on the political effect of that decision,
I quote:
"The legend around here is that Judge Blandford was defeated on account of this opinion-the J. P.'s got him. Be that as it may, I know of only
three members of this Court in 100 years who have been defeated, and he was
one. My grandfather served on this court with him, and had a high regard
for him, I think. The memorial sketch of him in 120 Ga. 1085, may interest
you." 11
"Aside from this aspect of the question, it is the duty of the state to afford
every litigant, without regard to the amount involved in his controversy, the
opportunity to secure a determination thereof according to the highest conception of justice. In this day and generation, when the poor man is receiving
a degree of attention never before accorded him-when the politician and law
maker are especially solicitous of his welfare, and when even the church opens
its door unto him and accords him welcome-we may well pause to inquire
whether the inferior court, presided over by a layman, is adequately equipped
to deal out substantial justice in a summary manner. It is no answer to say
that a retrial may be had on appeal, for this will afford but little satisfaction
to the poor litigant who is unable to furnish bond, 'with satisfactory surety',
to abide by and perform the judgment of the appellate court." 12
The number of cases arising in inferior tribunals, and the justice court,
that have eventually found their way to the Supreme Court of the United
States, substantiates the importance of the issues submitted for the determination by justices of the peace. It is interesting to note how many celebrated
cases have reached that august tribunal, all of which had their origin in the
"Bendheim Bros. & Co. vs. Baldwin (1884) 73 Ga. 594.
" Letter from K. C. Bleckley, Clerk of Supreme Court, State of Georgia, dated
April 5, 1946, to the writer.
12 "A Plea for the Reform of the Inferior Court," by Hon. Milton Strasburger,
Case and Comment, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 22, June, 1915.
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justice of the peace court in various jurisdictions since the founding of the republic.i'
The celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison where the Supreme Court
of the United States for the first time declared an act of Congress unconstitutional, arose out of the appointment of the midnight judges as justices of
the peace, appointed by John Adams prior to his departure from office on
the midnight of March 3, 1801, commonly known in the parlance of that
day as the "Midnight Judges." 14
The justices of the peace of Colorado have, among themselves, formed
what they call "Colorado Justices-Federated"? In that bulletin they realize
and emphasize the necessity for reform within their own fields and place part
of the blame upon the Colorado legislature and I quote various excerpts from
said bulletin:
"Organization is not a sentiment-it is an economic necessity. No Colorado legislature ever did anything for us. Every one of them has done something to us.
"The Colorado justice of the peace has been scolded and exhorted so
long that he would feel neglected if his critics should cease. But nobody has
ever suggested the practical steps to be taken to enable him to work out his
own salvation. The time has come to quit moralizing and 'bellyaching' and
devise a definite means for integrating Colorado justices so they can realize
their highest hopes.
"A simple, elastic and yet adequate set of rules of JP procedure cannot
be formed in Colorado except by experienced JP's and not until they are
mobolized to act as 'Colorado Justices, Federated.'
"By common assent, the need exists for legislation to reform the justice
of the peace courts in Colorado-their proceedings and machinery-and has
existed for over ten years.
"Ephphatha! 'Since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,'
Colorado justices of the peace have been dropping buckets into legislative
wells, and growing old drawing nothing up." 15
With the above quotations as prepared by some of the justices of the
peace of Colorado and their willingness to reform and amend the courts,
rules and procedures as they now exist, it becomes the duty of the Colorado
bar to aid and assist in that worthy cause. This article is prepared as a fore"3Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897; Ferris v. Higley, 20 Wall.
375, 22 L. ed. 383; Harris v. Barber, 129 U. S. 366, 32 L. ed. 697, 9 Sup .Ct. Rep.
314; Willis v. Eastern Trust & Bkg. Co. 169 U. S. 295, 42 L. ed. 752, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 347; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof. 174 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 873, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.
580; Alexander v. Crollott, 199 U. S. 580, 50 L. ed. 317, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161;
Heyman v. Southern R. Co. 203, U. S. 270, 51 L. ed. 178, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104,
7 Ann Cas. 1130; Kann v. King, 204 U. S. 43, 51 L. ed. 360, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213;
Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 472, 52 L. ed. 578, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370.
1 Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch, 137, 2 L. ed. 60.
"Vol. 1, No. 1, December JP News Bulletin, Larimer County Justices.
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runner for others which will subsequently follow as sponsored by the Colorado
Bar Association.
"There is no profession or class so habitually trusted with so large a
measure of public confidence as lawyers. They handle, a large amount of
business and have a direct influence on the thoughts of about 140 million
people." 16

New Members of the Denver Bar Association
The following persons were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar
Association at the December 9, 1946, meeting:
Richard L. Banta, Jr.
James J. Johnston
Raymond J. Gengler
Fred L. Schwartz
Philip F. Icke
William F. Stevens
Thomas M. Tierney
The following persons were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar
Association at the January 6, 1947, meeting:
William Bodan, Jr.
Richard G. Luxford
Duncan J. Cameron
Roscoe Walker, Jr.
Stanford L. Hyman
William G. Wright, III

Personals
EDWARD L. WOOD has moved his offices from 812 to 200 Equitable Bldg.,
Denver. Associated with him is Burton Crager, formerly of the Michigan bar.
Mr. Wood is a former president of the Colorado Bar Association.

Admitted to a Higher Court
ADDISON B.

MANNING, Denver, died in Santa Catalina Hospital, Avalon,
Calif., at the age of 52 years. He became ill while in California on vacation.
In addition to practising in Denver, he also maintained an office in Colorado
Springs where he was counsel for Aircraft Mechanics, Inc. He was a Mason,
in which order he has held several high offices. He was educated in the Denver
schools, Colo. Univ., and Denver Univ., from which he graduated in law,
cum laude.

CLARENCE E. WAMPLER, Denver, well-known attorney and active in many
organizations, died quite suddenly at his home. He has been practising in
Denver thirty years after graduating from Michigan U. in law.

"6Vital Speeches V. 6, Oct. 15, 1939-Oct. 1, 1940, "The Relationship of the
Laymen and the Members of the Bar," by Orel Busby, Justice of the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma, delivered at the Chamber of Commerce Public Forum Luncheon, Ada,
Oklahoma, Dec. 29, 1939.
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January Meeting of Denver Bar Association
E. Blythe Stason, dean of the University of Michigan Law School, recognized authority on administrative law, author of several books in this field,
and member of the U. S. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, was the speaker at the January 6, 1947, meeting of the Denver Bar
Association. He spoke on the subject "Administrative Control of Atomic
Energy." He said, in part:
This is one of the most important subjects before us today. I discuss it
because I have always been interested in physics and in the field of administrative law.
The administrative control of atomic energy has two aspects-the international and the domestic. If we can't find a way to solve the international
aspects, we will have no need to attempt to solve the domestic aspects. I
think the international aspects will be solved. This will require some loss of
sovereignty and some other things which some don't want. I will talk principally of the domestic aspects.
The "Atomic Energy Act of 1946" is one of the most important laws ever
adopted by Congress. Mr. Newman, counsel for the Senate committee said,
"This act cuts more deeply into private enterprise than any other act ever
passed by Congress."
We believe in the rule of law. We have been taught that some minor
matters should be left to administrative discretion, but the large problems
should be controlled by laws. There has been a great change in this philosophy.
Many of the new federal acts have adopted a new philosophy, and much discretion has been left to administrative agencies. This is a change from the rule
of law to a rule of administrative discretion, which is one of the penalties of
the change to a complex civilization.
The Atomic Energy Act was adopted by Congress in the summer of 1946.
The bill was well considered and well drafted. The sweeping powers granted
were great, and must be modified in the future. The act had four objectives:
promote research, regulate fissionable materials, to own and operate all processes and fissionable materials, and to regulate the utilization of all fissionable
materials. The act creates the commission, which has been appointed. It provides for research. It establishes absolute public ownership and control over
all fissionable materials. The commission is the owner of all processes and all
such materials. Control over sources of raw materials is provided. The commission may authorize the approved use of atomic energy unless such use is
vetoed by Congress. The commission may revoke a license to use without
cause. Private patents are prohibited in the field occupied by the government.
Patents may be granted for the industrial use of atomic energy, but the commission has large discretion in the use of such inventions.
Congress was faced with the necessity of doing something, and this act
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was the result. No act of Congress has ever conferred greater powers on a
commission. The commission has almost unlimited powers to aid research.
It may produce the materials. It could create a vast business to do this. It may
distribute fissionable materials. There are no standards to guide the commission.
No person may produce or utilize fissionable material without a license. The
commission has unlimited authority to prescribe the conditions of granting a
license.
If the act is wisely administered, it will result in great good, but mal administration will be very bad.
Where are we headed? What will be the end result if Congress continues to grant such great discretion to administrative agencies-continues to
rely on the discretion of men rather than the rule of law? What should Congress do to limit administrative discretion?
Congress should assume its share of responsibility by writing into law
every reasonably means to limit administrative discretion. Standards can be
stated. Administrative appeals can be used more effectively than they have
been in the past. The adversary method of proceeding can be utilized to a
greater extent. Legislative bodies can and should sharpen the standards to be
followed, and this must be done in the Atomic Energy Act as soon as possible.

Our Returning Lawyer-Veterans
S. VIGIL, served three years seven months in the United States Coast
Guard. He has now returned to Trinidad, where he is assistant district attorney.
CHARLES

Lawyers in the Public Service
J. GOBBLE, Brighton, and GEORGE G. PRIEST, Jefferson county, are
two more lawyers rendering public service at the state's most undercompensated job-member of the state House of Representatives. Added to the
names in January DICTA, these bring the number of lawyers in the House to
twelve. Both are members of several important House committees, and are
taking active parts in this year's legislative program.
CLIFFORD

Law Books Available
Edward Affolter, Louisville, who is retiring from practice, has advised
that he will make a gift to any lawyer or institution desiring to use them,
the American Bar Association Journals from 1926 to 1946, and the American
Bar Association Reports from 1916 to 1946. Anyone interested should write
to Mr. Affolter at Louisville, or phone Louisville 54 W.
Julius I. Ginsberg, 814 Majestic Bldg., Denver has for sale a number of
volumes of Colorado Reports and Colorado Appeals, and other miscellaneous
law books.
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November Meeting of Denver Bar Association
The November meeting of the Denver Bar Association was held on
November 15th instead of the 4th, as scheduled, because, according to the
secretary, "of the weather," said weather consisting of a 27 inch snow storm,
largest in Denver since 1913. Royal C. Rubright, eminent Denver title attorney, spoke on the subject, "Are Lawyers Too Busy to Practice Law?",'a slightly
confusing title. A summary of his remarks follows:
Lawyers today are too busy practising law to see other things of major
importance. Speaking as an attorney who seldom strays from the real estate
field, I speak from my experience in this field.
What is the function of the attorney in a real estate transaction? Our
ordinary concept is that he is to examine the title and render an opinion.
There are really three phases of a real estate transaction, of which this is
only one. The first phase is the receipt and option with which the buyer is
confronted at the start. The buyer, our client, needs our services there. We
aren't doing enough to make the buyer realize this. What can happen to the
buyer who does not have this legal service? One example is that of a buyer in
desperate need of a home into which he could immediately move. His contract provided that if title was not merchantable the seller had 120 days to
make it so. Obviously this contract did not meet the needs of the client,
and the client should have had this advice. In many other cases the purchaser needs the assistance of an attorney because the real estate agent has
little, if any, knowledge of legal matters. The purchaser should know what he
is entitled to in the way of adjustments and possession, and should have this
in the contract.
The second phase is the examination of the title and the rendering of the
opinion. In order to make it easier for another attorney to trace any objections made by the examining attorney, the examining attorney should refer,
in his opinion, to the abstract entry number, the book, page and date of the
recording, and the date of the instrument. All of these are important and
assist greatly in running down the objection.
The third phase is the closing of the deal, and this phase is the function
and duty of the attorney. Unless the attorney participates in the closing the
purchaser may not get a proper deed, and may not see that objections or conditions raised by the attorney are properly met. For example, if a survey is
requested, the survey made may not be sufficient.
It is the duty of the attorney to see that all these functions of the attorney in a real estate transaction are propertly fulfilled, and if they are not,
we are failing our clients.
Another matter is the preparation of contracts of sale and purchase of
real estate. Printed forms of contracts do not meet all the needs of such transaction. The contract should contain a statement either that the purchaser
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has examined the title and approves it, or that the purchaser accepts the title
without examination. Usual contracts provide that the "property should be
conveyed by the seller free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. This
should be limited to liens and encumbrances placed or permitted to be placed
thereon by the seller, and should not include liens and encumbrances placed
or permitted to be placed thereon by the purchaser, or by his failure to perform a duty of his. Such contracts should also specify what insurance should
be carried, such as fire and liability. Incidentally, many attorneys prefer to
use a note and deed of trust rather than a contract of sale and purchase, and
there is much to commend the note and deed of trust over the contract.
With respect to joint tenancies, laymen are constantly advising laymen.
Laymen fail to know and advise of certain legal difficulties which the lawyer knows or should know. For example, if all the funds for the purchase of
a property taken in joint tenancy are provided by one of the joint tenants,
a gift tax return should be filed with the state showing a gift to the other
joint tenant of one-half the value of the property, if the entire property is
worth more than $5,000. There is a great penalty for failure to file gift tax
returns. If the property is worth more than $6,000, there should also be
filed with the federal government a gift tax return, with a great penalty for
failure to do so. The unfavorable income tax situation must be regarded, because of the tax on capital gains. The federal estate tax must also be considered. It is the policy of the federal government to assume that the jointly
owned property should be entirely taxed in the decedent's estate, unless it
can be shown that part or all the funds were supplied by the survivor. On
some exchanges of property there is a taxable gain on the sale of one property, and the acquired property is acquired at the new base. Lawyers should
know these things and keep their clients advised as to them.
What is the lawyer's responsibility to the public? The lawyer must be
of better service to a larger segment of the population than he now is. There
is no one now to tell the prospective purchaser that he needs a lawyer. I
suggest that the bar associations prepare an illustrated pamphlet, showing the
need for attorneys in real estate transactions, and how attorneys, in such situations, can be of benefit to purchasers. These pamphlets would be available
at the desks of the clerks and recorders to all persons making inquiries about
real estate transactions. The recorders would be glad to cooperate with the
bar in the distribution of these pamphlets. This would be a simple and inexpensive way to get to prospective clients at the time they need the help of an
attorney.
How are the lawyers constantly benefitting the public at the lawyers'
own expense? One way is by adopting real estate standards which reduce the
expense to clients in lawsuits, and real estate transactions. This is against the
interests of the lawyers and save money for the public-our clients. We must
let the public know that we are taking these positions in their interest and
against ours.
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Regional Hearing on Military Justice
By

MILTON

J.

BLAKE*

On September 9, 1946, a regional hearing of the War Department
Advisory Committee on Military Justice, was held in Court Room A of the
District Court in Denver. Justice Alexander Holtzhoff, of the District
Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, conducted the hearing in behalf of the committee of which he is secretary. This committee was
appointed by the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson early this spring to
determine whether the administration of justice in the army can be improved and to make recommendations for that purpose.
The committee, whose membership was nominated by the President of
the American Bar Association, Willis Smith of North Carolina, at the request of Secretary Patterson, is composed of the following:
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, of Newark, New Jersey, a former president
of American Bar Association, dean of the New York University Law
School and chairman of the United States Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee on the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, chairman.
Alexander Holtzhoff, of Washington, D. C., judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, secretary.
Walter P. Armstrong, of Memphis, Tennessee, a former President
of the American Bar Association.
Frederick E. Crane, of New York, New York former Chief Judge
of New York State Court of Appeals.
Joseph W. Henderson, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a former
president of the American Bar Association.
W. T. Joyner, of Raleigh, North Carolina.
Jacob M. Lashley, of St. Louis, Missouri, a former President of the
American Bar Association.
Morris A. Soper, of Baltimore, Maryland, Circuit Judge, United
States Circuit Court.
Floyd E. Thompson, of Chicago, Illinois, former Chief Justice
of Illinois.
In the official War Department directive appointing the committee,
(W. D. Memorandum No. 25-46, 25 March 1946) the function of the committee is stated to be:
"To study the administration of military justice within the
army's courts-martial system and to make recommendations to the
* Of the Denver bar. Mr. Blake, a colonel in The Judge Advocate General's De,
partment during the war, served as secretary and acting chairman of the Special Committee on arrangements of the Colorado Bar Association for this hearing. The com
mittee referred to in this article has now completed its work and made its report. See
American Bar Association Journal, Jan. 1947, p. 40 and 45.
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Secretary of War as to changes in existing laws, regulations, and
practices which the committee considers necessary or appropriate to
improve the administration of military justice in the army."
The directive further provides that:
"The committee is to have full freedom of action in the accomplishment of its mission and is authorized to hold such hearings and
call such witnesses as it may deem desirable, and to call upon the
office of Under Secretary of War, The Judge Advocate General,
and any other appropriate agency of the War Department for information or assistance needed in the conduct of its activities."
The Secretary of War, in appointing the committee, advised Mr. Vanderbilt, the chairman, that the War Department wishes to have the "most
efficient and just system of military justice that can be devised in the light of
military experience, American conceptions of punitive justice, and enlightened
penology." He further stated to Mr. Vanderbilt that:
"As you undoubtedly know, the present army courts-martial
system is founded on Articles of War, which were revised by the
Congress in 1920. We have just come through a long war during
which the army reached great strength and in the course of which
it was found necessary to try many men by army courts-martial.
In view of the number of personnel brought within the jurisdiction
of the courts-martial system and the necessary abruptness of the
conversion of millions of citizens into disciplined soldiers, it is not
surprising that grievances have been expressed in various quarters.
It is the course of wisdom to make a thorough review of our courtsmartial experiences in this War and to derive benefits from those
experiences. I am happy to have the wise counsel of the committee
selected by the American Bar Association in that important task.
The investigation and advice of the committee on which I am
asking you to serve will be of very great value in reaching this
result."
Soon after its appointment, the committee met in Washington to begin
its study and determined that it was concerned only with procedures and
not with individual cases, other than as such cases may "illustrate either
the necessity of change or the need for preservation of present system of
military justice." (32ABAJ255).
Since then the committee has been busily engaged in taking testimony
from War Department officials and from many other interested persons and
organizations who have knowledge of the courts-martial system. In order to
give all who wished to testify a chance to appear, the committee determined
to hold regional hearings in various parts of the United States, and a series
of such hearings was arranged. The method adopted was to assign a particular
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region to one of the members to conduct the hearing and to call upon the
local bar association to arrange the hearing for that region.
Consequently the Colorado Bar Association was requested to arrange
a hearing to be held in Denver on September 9, 1946. In response to this
request, the Colorado Bar Association appointed a Special Committme on Arrangements with Royal R. Irwin, of the Denver bar, as chairman. This
special committee notified a large number of Colorado lawyers, who had
served in the armed forces, of the scheduled hearing and invited them to appear and testify if they so desired and furnished to them a "topical outline,"
which the War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice had
prepared. This topical outline is very broad in scope and was designed to
stimulate testimony on a wide variety of subjects. In addition, several of
the veterans' organizations were invited to send representatives and the Denver
papers carried press notices of the scheduled hearing, so that anyone who
wished to testify had notice of the hearing.
In order to avoid duplication and to save time, those who desired to
testify were requested to appear at a preliminary meeting which was held in
Court Room B on September 6, 1946. At that time a program was arranged, alloting a specific time to each one desiring to appear.
The hearing was held on September 9, 1946, and was presided over by
Justice Holtzhoff, the member of the committee assigned to this region. It
was conducted, in general, in the manner customarily pursued in legislative
committee hearings. An average of about 15 minutes was allotted to each
witness-some took more, some took less, while others presented prepared
papers. None of the witnesses were sworn and, at Justice Holtzhoff's request, the procedings were conducted informally, with each witness being
given full opportunity to express his views in his own way:
The following persons, most of whom are Denver lawyers, testified at
the hearing:
Victor A. Miller
Samuel H. Sterling
Theo. A. Chisholm
Edward V. Dunklee
Horace F. Phelps
LeRoy Seckler
Hamlet Barry, Jr.
Charles E. Works
Charles A. Baer
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr.
Frank Seydel
William E. Doyle
James N. Sabin
William D. Powell
Robert T. Kingsley
Robert D. Charlton
Herbert J. Newcomb
W. F. O'Brien
Mr. Barnard A. Gates, National Field Secretary of the American
Legion, was in attendance as an observer for the American Legion.
Due to the illness of Mr. Irwin, the Chairman of the Special Commit,
tee on Arrangements, the author of this article, the Secretary of the Special
Committee, acted as chairman and presented the witnesses as they appeared
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to Justice Holtzhoff, and otherwise assisted him in the conduct of the hearing.
The proceedings and all testimony were reported stenographically, and
transcriptions thereof will be furnished to each of the members of the War
Department Committee for their study and consideration. A similar procedure is being followed at all other regional hearings, which are being conducted by other members of the committee, so that all of the committee will
be able to have all of the testimony, wherever presented, available for their
deliberations.
The witnesses at the Denver hearing expressed a wide variety of viewssometimes in conflict, sometimes in accord, with each other-on the many
subjects discussed. Although there had been no attempt by the Special Committee on Arrangements to arrange for witnesses of various types to be present
and all who did so came forward voluntarily, a remarkable feature was that
the testimony was heard from those who had served in all parts of the World,
in all ranks-from private to colonel- and in all the various capacities incident to the courts-martial system, i. e. trial judge advocate, defense counsel,
law member of the court, commanding officer, law clerk, and as staff judge
advocate for both the appointing and the reviewing authorities, as well as
those who had served on boards of review and in military justice divisions of
higher command, and in the Judge Advocate General's Office in Washington.
In support of the activity of the committee and to encourage participation
and the free expression of views, Major General Thomas H. Green, the Judge
Advocate General, prior to the hearing wrote to some of those participating,
who are, or were, members of his department, urging them to testify and to
have other judge advocates testify. He expressed his purpose in the following
words:

_I am very much interested in having this committee receive
the views of persons who are experienced in the operation of the
system. To that end I am sending notices out to judge advocates so
that they may avail themselves of an opportunity to appear before
the committee and give the benefit of their experiences. * * *
I am interested solely in obtaining the best possible system of military
justice for the army."
As a consequence, the judge advocates, and the others, who participated
expressed themselves freely and the whole scope of military justice was discussed. Justice Holtzhoff expressed himself as well pleased at the results of
the hearing and in having received many constructive suggestions. All who
participated appeared sincerely interested in improving the system. Those
who made criticisms made them in a dispassionate and analytical manner, as
did those who had words of praise for parts or all of the system.
On the evening of September 9th, Justice Holtzhoff appeared as the
principal speaker at a meeting of the Denver Chapter, Reserve Officers Association, and discussed the work of his committee. Following his address, a
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general discussion was had in which many of the reserve officers present
expressed their views on military justice and Justice Holtzhoff announced
that the committee was desirous of hearing from all who wished to offer anything on the subject, particularly from those who had had actual experience
with the system in World War II. He suggested that those interested put
their views in a letter addressed to Justice Alexander Holtzhoff, Secretary,
War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice, Room 3D746, The
Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C., and particularly suggested the use of the
aforementioned "topical outline" (which is appended to this article) for such
purpose.
The responsibility for the administration of justice, whether in the
civil or military courts rests with the legal profession, and it is therefore a
source of gratification that the American Bar Association has taken the lead
in this matter and that the Colorado Bar Association and local lawyers were
privileged to have the opportunity to assist the Committee in its labors. The
importance of this study is manifest and the manner in which it is being
conducted is in accord with the best traditions of the legal profession.
Considering all this, and particularly the high calibre of membership of
the War Department Advisory Committee on Miltiary Justice, there can be
little doubt that its report to the Secretary of War will be sound and unbiased, and that any recommendations it may make will be well considered,
constructive, and in furtherance of the American ideals of justice.

War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice
Topical Outline
I. GENERAL
1. Purposes of court-martial system; maintenance of discipline or administration of justice?
2. Merits and weaknesses or defects of existing system.
3. Causes of weaknesses and defects: (a) the system, organization, and procedure in themselves; (b) the administration of the system; or (c) personnel.
4. Are weaknesses and defects found in time of peace to the same extent
as in time of war? If not, why? Is the difference, if any, to be explained by the difference between professional officers and temporary
officers?
5. Are officers, both permanent and temporary, given sufficient training in
ideals, purposes, rules, and practical administration of military justice?
If not, what improvements are desirable?
6. Should there be any difference in dealing with offenses at the front during actual military operations and offenses committed behind the lines
or in training areas?
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7. Should there be any difference in dealing with military and nonmilitary
offenses?
8. Does the lresent system in actual operation often result in actual miscarriages of justice: (a) are the innocent convicted?; (b) are the guilty
punished excessively, or too leniently; and (c) are the guilty acquitted?
9. Does the present system in actual operation often result in inequalities of
treatment as between officers and enlisted men: (a) in respect to filing
charges and ordering trial: (b) in respect to convictions and acquittals
(c) in respect to sentences?
10. To what extent, if at all, do inadequacies of company commanders result
in trials by court-martial? Is there any difference in this respect as between (a) permanent and temporary officers, and (b) officers commissioned directly from civil life and officers who rose from the ranks?
11. Is there a tendency to assign less capable officers to court-martial duty?
12. Advisability of expanding Judge Advocate General's Department, making it more independent and increasing its authority.
13. Advisability of increasing the use of capable, experienced, retired officers,
and those partially disabled for court-martial duty.
14. Advisability of assigning enlisted men to serve as members of courtsmartial.
15. Is there a marked disparity in the sentences imposed in different commands?
II. JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL.
1. To what extent are cases tried by general courts-martial that might be advantageously disposed of by special or summary courts or by company
punishment?
2. For the purpose of maintaining discipline, should there be an increase in
the authority of company commanders to impose company punishment,
and an expansion in the jurisdiction of summary courts and special courts,
leaving to general courts-martial only the trials of heinous military offenses, such as cowardice in the face of the enemy and desertion; and
grave nonmilitary crimes, such as murder, rape, robbery, etc.?
3. Should summary courts or at least special courts-martial be granted some
jurisdiction over officers?
4. Should more nonmilitary offenses be turned over to civil courts for trial?
III. FILING AND INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES
1. Are any changes desirable in the procedure of filing charges?
2. Is present system of preliminary investigation of charges adequate or are
any changes.desirable?
3. Does the present system of preliminary investigation of charges operate
properly in actual practice?
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IV. DIRECTING TRIAL OF CHARGES
1. Is the present system adequate?
2. Are there undue delays in determining whether the accused should be
tried?
3. Are arrest and confinement of the accused before trial used unduly and
unnecessarily?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

V. ORGANIZATION OF COURTS-MARTIAL
Are summary courts properly organized?
Are special courts--martial properly organized?
Adequacy of present mode of selection of defense counsel.
To what extent are courts-martial under the domination of convening
authority?
The advisability of withdrawing from field command the authority to
convene general courts-martial, except possibly in battle areas in cases of
emergency, and the establishment of permanent general courts-martial
in each area, such courts-martial to be organized by the Judge Advocate
General's Department and to be independent of command.
The advisability of appointing as the law member, the trial judge advocate,
and the defense counsel only trained officers who belong to the Judge
Advocate General's Department; the trial judge advocate, and the defense counsel to be of the same rank, if at all possible; such assignments
to be permanent and full-time, rather than temporary part-time details.
The advisability of vesting in the law member full authority to rule finally on all questions of law but giving him no vote on the court; and leaving to the remaining members of the court only the functions of determining guilt or innocence and determining what sentence should be
imposed in case of conviction-in other words, assimilating the functions
of the law member to those of a judge, and the functions of the remaining
members to those of a jury.
VI. COURTS-MARTIAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
Are any changes in trial procedure desirable?
Does defense counsel have adequate opportunity to defend the accused, or
is vigorous defense discouraged?
Does the defense have adequate opportunity to procure compulsory attendance of witnesses?
Should the use of depositions by the prosecution by permitted?
To what extent, if at all, should the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to used by courts-martial?
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6. Should unanimous vote be required to convict?
7. To what extent, if at all, does the practice prevail of imposing severe excessive sentences, leaving it to the reviewing authority to reduce the sentence, instead of endeavoring to impose a proper sentence in the first instance? If the practice exists, should it be eliminated, and, if so, how?
8. Are courts-martial records complete and accurate verbatim transcripts of
actual proceedings?
9. Are there undue delays in court-martial proceedings?
10. Should there be a change in existing practice which makes it mandatory
for a general court-martial to impose a dishonorable discharge in case a
sentence of imprisonment of six months or more is also imposed?
Should the power to inflict a dishonorable discharge in such cases be
discretionary?
11. Should general court-martial be given power, which it does not now have,
to suspend sentence and place the accused on probation?
Should the use of dishonorable discharges generally be reduced, as part of
a court-martial sentence?
12. Is it desirable to introduce a discharge, such as the bad conduct discharge
of the Navy, which would rid the Army of an undesirable soldier, and yet
not have a disastrous permanent effect on him? In that event, should
dishonorable discharges be reserved for more grave and heinous cases?
13. Are some species of presentence investigations feasible?
VII. REVIEW OF COURT-MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Is the present system of review adequate as to (a) summary courts, (b)
special courts-martial, and (c) general courts-martial?
2. Should the trial judge advocate and the defense counsel be accorded an
opportunity as a matter of routine to submit briefs or memoranda to the
reviewing authority and to the Judge Advocate General?
3. Is any change desirable in the method of review of death sentences?
VIII. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
1. Advisability of amending Articles of War and Court-Martial Manual in
respect to definitions of offenses and provisions for penalties.
2. Advisability of modifying Article 95 so that dismissal would not be mandatory penalty in case of conviction of an officer. Consider the possibility that such modification might minimize the reluctance to courtmartial
an officer.
3. Advisability of making Article 96 more specific.
4. In case of trials for nonmilitary offenses committed in foreign countries,
what substantive law should govern?
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Newly Admitted Members of the Bar
GEORGE L. STRAIN, admitted May 1946 as result of June 1945 bar exam.

Colo. U., B.S. 1938; George Washington U., LL.B. 1941. Member Phi
Gamma Delta and Phi Delta Phi. Was special agent F.B.I. for 5 years.
Member D.C. and N.Y. bars. Associated with Miller and Allen, La Junta.
admitted Sept. 1946 as result
of June bar exam. New Mexico U. 1943; Colo. U. 1945. Member Chi
Omega. Member Board of Editors and business manager Rocky Mountain
Law Review, 1944, 1945. Had secretarial experience before admission to
practice. Is associated with her husband, F. Gordon Shermack at 452
Humboldt St., Denver. Interested in probate and trusts.
ANNETTE R. (MRs. F. GORDON) SHERMACK,

admitted Sept. 1946 as result of June bar
exam. Va. U., Denver U., Colo. U., LL.B. 1946. Member Beta Theta Pi.
On editorial board of Rocky Mountain Law Review. Interested in administrative law, real property, oil and gas, water law, taxation and insurance.
Associated with his wife, Annette R. Shermack at 452 Humboldt St.,
Denver, and with January and Yegge, insurance investigation dept., Equitable
Bldg., Denver.
FREDERICK GORDON SHERMACK,

admitted Sept. 1946 as result of June bar exam.
Colo. U., 1926-1928; Tulane U., 1932-1934, B.B.A. 1934; Southern Methodist U., LL.B. Magna Cum Laude, 1943. Member Sigma Nu, Phi Alpha
Delta, Order of the Woolsack. Was president law students' association. Has
had experience in ranching in Colo., accounting. Admitted to Texas bar,
1944. Was briefing clerk to Chief Justice Alexander, Texas Supreme Court,
instructor in law school, Southern Methodist U., and was in practice in
Dallas, 1944-1946. Interested in irrigation, oil and gas, constitutional law.
Now in practice in Avery Bldg., Fort Collins.
JOHN STUMP WITCHER,

R. CLAYTON, admitted Sept. 1946 as result of June bar exam. George
Washington U., Westminster Law School. Member Sigma Alpha Epsilon.
Was special agent, F.B.I. Associated with Kelly and Snvder, First National
Bank Bldg., Greeley.
JOHN

H. SHAW, admitted under special soldier rule. Was special agent
F.B.I. 1942-1943. Served Office Strategic Services and Army Air Corps,
1-943-1946. Served in India-Burma Theater, Malaya, and Dutch East Indies.
Received Army Commendation Medal, Central Burma Campaign battle
award. Discharged as captain. Now associated with Lee, Shaw and McCreery, 1217 First Natl. Bank Bldg., Denver, and is Deputy District Attorney,
Denver.
RICHARD
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H. TIPPIT, admitted May 1946 under special soldier rule. Okla. U.,
A.B. 1938, LL.B. 1940. Member Phi Beta Kappa and Beta Theta Pi.
Admitted to practice Okla. 1940, and then elected county attorney, Love
County. Was in A.A.F. 4!/2 years. Interested in oil and gas. Now practising
in own office, 411 E. & C. Bldg., Denver.
JOHN

FRANK H. CONRY, admitted April 1946 under special soldier rule. Colo. U.,
Westminster Law School, LL.B. 1944. Worked many years for Colorado
Natl. Bank, Denver. Served in Army Medical Corps. Now associated with
Duncan J. Cameron in general practice, 509 E. & C. Bldg., Denver.
P. AKOLT, JR., admitted June 1946 under special soldier rule. Notre
Dame 1936-1937; Colo. U. 1938; Denver U. 1939-1941, 1946, A.B. 1940.
Member Chi Psi and Phi Delta Phi. Was with army air forces 1941-1945.
Now in general civil practice in association with Brock, Akolt, Campbell,
and Myer, 1300 Telephone Bldg., Denver.
JOHN

GORDON H. ROWE, JR., admitted July 1946 under special soldier rule. Colo.
U. A.B. 1942; LL.B. 1946. Member Delta Tau Delta and Phi Delta Phi.
Interested in water and criminal law. Associated with Frank L. Shaw, 47
Adams, Monte Vista.
I. RAvrrz, admitted March 1946 under special soldier rule. Utah U.
B.S. 1937; Geo. Washington U. J.D. 1941. Member Phi Kappa Phi, Skull
and Bones, Scabbard and Blade, Senior Honor Roll, law review staff. Was
in army five years. Employed in U. S. Senate while attending law school.
Interested in anti-trust, taxation, corporations. Would like connection with
Denver law firm. Now with Veterans Administration Branch Office 13,
Denver Federal Center, Denver.

HARRY

WILIAMS, admitted July 1946 under special soldier-rule. Colo. U.
B.A. 1940; Denver U. LL.B. 1946. Member Sigma Alpha Epsilon and Phi
Delta Phi. -Was in men's retail apparel for ten years. Interested in criminal
law. Now with Williams Stores Co., 82 Broadway, Denver.

JACK W.

M. FLEETWOOD, admitted on motion Sept. 1946. Okla. U. LL.B
1931. Member Phi Gamma Delta, Phi Delta Phi, Blue Key, Kappa Nu
Theta. Was on legal staff Barnsdall Oil Co., Tulsa, for ten years; also in
general practice. Specialized in proration and legislative law, oil field damage
suits, titles, contracts. Is now practising from 1080 Sherman St., Denver,
and is associated with brother in Fleetwood Investment Co., handling oil
leases and royalties. Is interested in associating with firm requiring oil and gas
law specialization.

WILLIAM

